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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK	
3	BARBARA STEWART,	
4	Plaintiff,	New York, N.Y.
5	V.	19 Civ. 5960(NRB)
6	MICHELE STEWART a/k/a Michele Bouman-Stewart,	
7	Defendant.	
9	x	
10		April 1, 2020 12:07 p.m.
11	Before:	
12	HON. NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD,	
13		District Judge
14	APPEARANCES (via teleconference)	
15	MARCUS & CINELLI, LLP	
16	Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: DAVID P. MARCUS EDWARD P. YANKELUNAS	
17	MEYNER AND LANDIS LLP	
18	Attorneys for Defendant BY: DAVID GRANTZ	
19	CATHERINE PASTRIKOS KELLY	
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(Teleconference established)

THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Buchwald.

ALL COUNSEL: Good morning, Judge.

THE COURT: Good morning. All right. I just need to know -- I'm counting that there are seven people on the line. I only want to have identified the people who will be speaking for the plaintiff and for the defendant. And we have a court reporter, so it is absolutely essential that before you say anything, that you state your name. OK?

So, who is going to speak for the plaintiff?

MR. MARCUS: Judge, it's Dave Marcus for the plaintiff. I will be speaking.

THE COURT: OK. And for --

MR. GRANTZ: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is

David Grantz from Meyner and Landis. I will be speaking for
the defendant, but my partner, Catherine Kelly, is also on the
line, and she will also be addressing issues relating to
discovery. I don't think there will be any confusion between
the two of us.

THE COURT: OK. Let me state, which I probably should have for the record, that this conference call is being held in the case of Stewart against Stewart, 19 Civ. 5960, and the purpose of the call is to address a series of letters going back to February 3rd and up into March. March 24 I think may be the last one.

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So let's -- so the letters concern probably speaking two topics. One is the motion of -- or the proposed motion of the plaintiff to the defendant's counterclaims and the second general subject is discovery.

So let me say, on the topic of the motion to dismiss,

I think it is a total waste of time. I think that the bottom

line here is that the parties need to learn by e-discovery the

universe of documents which exist or don't exist, and only then

with that universe of documents, will we know what can or

cannot be proven. And I don't think that motions at this stage

will make any sense. I think in the end, the documents,

probably combined with depositions which will explore whether

the documents are consistent with the positions that people are

taking, or have taken over the years, will be the answer. I

don't think any motions at this time will be valuable.

Turning to the issues of discovery. I think perhaps one of the easier ones concerns the subpoena to Tres. That's T-r-e-s. I have no problem if the parties wish -- or any party wishes to try to compel a response to that subpoena.

There seems also to be an issue related to what search terms were used, I believe, if I recall, by the plaintiff. I think that that's easy enough to deal with. I think, if my memory is correct on that, that the defendant is asserting that plaintiff didn't utilize enough search terms. The defendant counsel can certainly tell the plaintiff's counsel what search

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terms the defendant used. And I don't really know why it would be unduly burdensome for the plaintiff to run another search if there are additional terms that make sense for the plaintiff to utilize. I don't think this issue of search terms ought to be a deal breaker.

There's also an issue related to attorney-client privilege. So, two things on that. One, if there are documents which are being held on the basis of attorney-client privilege, I would like those documents to be submitted to me with an explanation. I will look at them and determine whether it is an appropriate assertion of privilege.

Obviously, if you don't want to put them up on ECF, the mails are still working. Mail that is sent to the courthouse will be forwarded to me at home, and I will be able to look at it. But I think there is perhaps a bigger issue which I would like to hear from you about. If I'm correct, the privilege documents that are being withheld are between the defendant and the attorney, a Mr. Iglehart. Am I correct?

MS. KELLY: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, I think Mr. Iglehart has a real conflict problem, and I don't know that anything that he is trying to resolve he can. But if what I read is correct, at one point Mr. Iglehart represented the plaintiff's husband and the plaintiff. I do not know how an attorney can now take on a representation of the defendant which is contrary in this case

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to the position of his former client, and I don't see,
therefore, why anything he is doing is privileged, because I'm
not sure he really could have even commenced an attorney-client
relationship with the defendant --

MS. KELLY: Your Honor --

THE COURT: -- certainly to be accepted to the contrary to the plaintiff --

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, at the time that Iglehart represented defendant -- and I apologize, your Honor. This is Catherine Kelly, on behalf of the defendant. There are two documents that are on our privilege log that are being withheld. The first one is dated from 2010 and the second is 2009. At that time, I'm not sure whether a conflict would have existed between the parties, but we can brief that issue for your Honor, if the Court would like.

THE COURT: I just think it's, you know, kind of a problem. You know, there is no question that the defendant and the plaintiff have a conflict, and there also appears to be no question that the attorney represented the plaintiff at one point and is now representing the defendant.

MR. GRANTZ: This is David Grantz. I understand -for the defendant. I understand the issue that you are raising
about conflicts, and I do think we need to dig in a little bit
further. You mentioned it in our first conference, when we
were there in person, that you had some concerns about

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Mr. Iglehart's representation.

My understanding is that he was representing

Mr. Stewart and Mrs. Stewart in the '90s and then going forward

sometime into the 2000s and maybe later. At some point in the

relationship, the attorney started to represent the defendant

in the context of the issues that were being done with respect

to this jewelry and the relationship between the defendant and

the entities that were formed to hold the jewelry, so at the

time there would not have been any conflict of interest between

the plaintiff and the defendant.

THE COURT: Why?

MR. GRANTZ: Who are adverse to each other --

THE COURT: The position --

(Teleconference computer beeping)

THE COURT: Hello. Have we lost anybody?

MR. GRANTZ: You didn't lose me. This is Mr. Grant.

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, do I have you?

MR. MARCUS: Dave Marcus, still here.

THE COURT: OK. Ms. Kelly.

MS. KELLY: Yes, I'm still here. Thank you.

THE COURT: The court reporter, who at the moment is

nameless to me?

THE COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, your Honor. This is

24 | Vincent Bologna.

THE COURT: Hi, Vincent. How are you?

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THE COURT REPORTER: OK.

(Discussion off the record)

THE COURT: Let's go back.

Mr. Grantz, why don't you repeat what you said because I probably interrupted you.

MR. GRANTZ: So, there was no interruption, Judge.

The issue that I'm raising is that at the time that we're talking about in 2009 and 2010, the representation was not a circumstance where the plaintiff and defendant were adverse to each other. They were working, you know, in tandem essentially. Ms. Stewart and her husband had delivered the jewelry to Topaze, which was formed in the '90s and changed to DGBF, and they designated her as the beneficial owner of the company. And she was involved with Mr. Iglehart entering into a fiduciary agreement so that he could serve the entity, and he represented her in that capacity and other capacities as well. But at the time there would not have been any conflict between his dual representation of Ms. Stewart in the context of her delivering jewelry to this entity and the beneficial owner. Sorry.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. When you say "Ms. Stewart," why don't we say the plaintiff and the defendant, since they both have the same name here.

MR. GRANTZ: Sure. I refer to my client as Ms. Bouman.

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THE COURT: All right. Fair enough.

MR. GRANTZ: I apologize. I don't want to talk over you.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. GRANTZ: No, that's it. I respectfully disagree that there would have been a conflict of interest for Mr. Iglehart back in 2009 and 2010. And to the extent that they are withholding documents based on privilege during that time, I don't agree that he would have had a conflict then. the extent he was representing Michele Bouman in the context of something against Mrs. Stewart now or within the last few years, then, yes, but that's not what we're raising.

THE COURT: All right. But back in 2009, or leaving aside the time, you're saying that there was no conflict, but does that mean that your client at that time agrees with the position of the plaintiff here that that jewelry was put into the Topaze entity to avoid taxes on the plaintiff and was being held by the entity essentially in trust for the plaintiff's granddaughters?

MR. GRANTZ: I think that there is no disagreement about that up until a certain point. I think that that's an accurate statement up until I believe 2007, at which point there was a change in the relationship, and Ms. Stewart and all of the people involved in this determined that Michele should be the beneficial owner of the jewelry and when Michele died

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she should have it passed along to the children. So, yeah, I think that there are distinctions to be made, but I don't disagree that the jewelry was placed into Topaze sometime in the beginning of the '90s and continually thereafter for this purpose, but I don't know if I want to use the word "trust" since there was never a formal trust created and no writing associating anyone to a trust.

THE COURT: And what document in 2007 says that the plaintiffs in this case said instead of retaining my sort of life interest in this jewelry, I would like to give all of this jewelry to my ex-daughter-in-law?

MR. GRANTZ: So, Judge --

THE COURT: Or maybe then daughter-in-law. I don't have all the marital details in my brain.

MR. GRANTZ: I don't have every document in front of me that could answer that question and I don't think you do, either, because we didn't submit all of that. But I can tell you that I am looking at a couple of documents in front of me right now, one of which is a 2009 document in which Ms. Stewart wrote a letter to Mr. Iglehart, and it was faxed on November 9, 20 -- excuse me, November 6, 2009. And it says: "John, I, Barbara Stewart, hereby direct you to consider Michele Bouman beneficial owner of DGBF Holdings, Ltd. This letter is to reiterate what I have said to you verbally in the past, that is, that Michele Bouman be considered as sole beneficiary owner

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of all shares and assets of DGBF Holdings. Best regards," signed by Ms. Stewart.

And I have an email that precedes that by a few months, and I believe it is sent on September 10, 2009. But to be honest, Judge, sometimes these emails have the dates a little flipped because some are being sent from Europe and some are being sent from the U.S. So this one says Thursday, 9/10 2009, so I am assuming it is September 10, 2009 and not October 9th. It says, "Michele, a request has been made by Bill's counsel for all financial documents relating to Topaze, Ltd. You are the beneficial owner of the company. I have no ownership interest in the company. My counsel has explained that to the Court in New York. Nevertheless, the Court has directed the documents relating to Topaze be produced. Since I am not the owner, I cannot direct anyone to turn over the documents. Either you can provide them to me so that I may comply with the Court's directives or you should instruct John Iglehart to produce the documents that have been requested. Either way, the documents need to be forwarded to me."

So this is in 2009. Then in 2007 there was a fiduciary agreement that was prepared by Mr. Iglehart in which he was declared the fiduciary for the entity and Ms. Bouman was the beneficial owner, and she signed the fiduciary agreement with Mr. Iglehart. So — and you kind of put me on the spot as to what document. There are a lot of documents. But I can

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tell you about those right off the top of my head.

THE COURT: And, you know, we would all agree that at no time -- or would we all agree at no time was the plaintiff ever a beneficial owner of the shares of Topaze or the successor entity or --

MR. GRANTZ: There is no --

THE COURT: -- is that correct?

MR. GRANTZ: There's no evidence to suggest that, and all of the testimony in the prior proceedings, in the trust action and the divorce action, that we've seen have suggested that she was never the beneficial owner and never intended to be the beneficial owner and that the jewelry was intended to be out of her name so that I presume she could avoid tax liability.

MR. MARCUS: Judge, this is Dave Marcus here.

I mean, I would respectfully disagree. I mean, the documents, if we get into the weeds, they are certainly inconsistent. There are documents showing — as early as 1996, there is a document from Iglehart to Michele which says that Bill Stewart is going to continue to determine what happens with the jewelry with instruction from him. There was an understanding that the jewelry be put in this company Topaze, but there is — there is no — I mean, I'm not sure what "beneficial owner" means, to begin with, and I think that term can be a little bit flexible. But certainly I think Barbara

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Stewart understood that the jewelry was going to be put in a company, Topaze. Whether she had an ownership interest in Topaze or not, she understood and I think all the parties understood that she continued to hold some of the jewelry and that she would have use of it.

I don't think she understood the legalities of it.

This was all done by Iglehart and set up by Bill Stewart. I think everybody agrees to that, that that case, that it was done as sort of a tax shelter. But the fact that a letter — the letter that Mr. Grantz is referring to in 2009 appears to have been written by Mr. Iglehart as a witnessed by line and at the same time he is writing a letter saying why don't you sign this saying that Michele Stewart is the beneficial owner, and he is supposedly representing Michele Stewart. And it appears from other documents that they are having a relationship at the time, and this is where the conflict I think that you — that you referenced earlier comes in.

There is no clarity to who was the beneficial owner. We don't know who owned Topaze, and there is no documents which indicate who the owner of that company was. But there are documents suggesting that it continued to be controlled by Barbara and Bill Stewart because they were taking directions from Barbara and Bill Stewart. So to say that they had no interest in it, I don't think we can -- we certainly haven't come to that determination.

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And the burden is on the defendant here, who is claiming that she has taken ownership of a company that there is no corporate documents ever showing that any delivery of jewelry was made to a company, that the company -- what Michele Stewart's -- Bouman's interest in the company was, or how it was ever transferred to her. There is no evidence of this.

And that's why, Judge, if I can take a step backwards, I think it's so important to have this motion on the counterclaim heard, not so much because that needs to be -that issue needs to be decided now, but because the scope of discovery will be so expansive. What they're seeking is -- as opposed to seeking documents showing the company ownership, who had an interest in the company, how the company got transferred, those are the critical documents in this case -they want all -- they want to go through -- they want us to look at every email that Barbara Stewart ever sent to any member of her family. And there are over 30/40 years and there are thousands of them, tens of thousands maybe. And for us to go through all of those for no purpose at all, to find where maybe Barbara Stewart said to one of her sons, oh, you know, I'm wearing this piece of jewelry for -- I have a function or what have you, I don't see a purpose of it.

I think that the motion -- I'm sorry, did you want to say something?

THE COURT: I don't think I follow why this motion

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will accomplish anything. I think that's what I said at the outset.

MR. MARCUS: OK.

THE COURT: Is you really -- in the end, one of you is going to be able to prove your side, and only one of you, or maybe nobody, but you don't get -- let me phrase it another way. If you were making a motion for summary judgment, this would be an ideal textbook case where the other side would say, Judge, we can't respond to this motion for summary judgment without additional discovery. It seems to me this is essentially the same position that we're in now.

MR. MARCUS: May I respond, Judge?

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MARCUS: Yeah. I would respectfully disagree with that because we have here there is -- based on the pleadings, based on the pleadings alone and the counterclaim, the counterclaim cannot stand. It must fall, and it falls under its own weight. And they're saying here -- I mean, to show that there was a gift, they're saying that there were two gifts that were made. One is that all the jewelry -- all of Barbara's jewelry was gifted to Topaze, number one. Secondly, that the company, Topaze, or its successor DGBF, whatever, was gifted to Michele Stewart. In order to show that, there must be facts alleged -- they must show that there are corporate records, there are corporate documents, there was a delivery of

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jewelry, there was an intent to make a gift, that was a gift. It must be established that there was an intent to make a gift at that time, present intention, and that you can't reserve any of the gift to yourself, or you can't make it for a future time. And what they're saying is, well, she wasn't really putting it in, it was a tax shelter; she wasn't looking to make a gift, she was looking to shelter it. And there is no evidence — there is no pleading that there was — specific factual pleading of any delivery of the jewelry. There was no pleading that the company was — or who it was owned by, who Topaze was owned by. She might have put it in Topaze and she owned Topaze. We don't even —

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Documents were submitted, which I actually read very recently, under cover of letter of February 26, which are records about Topaze, and at least for a period of time, it shows who were the owners, who had the stock, what the assets of Topaze were. I'm not --

MR. MARCUS: If I may --

THE COURT: -- on what that all means. But to say that there is no record of sort of the history, to some extent, of Topaze is not quite accurate, I think.

MR. MARCUS: Well, I think it is accurate. I think what you're referring to are documents which indicate that John Iglehart was the owner of --

THE COURT: I agree with you. 999 out of a thousand

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or 99 out of a hundred in somebody else's name, who I don't know.

MR. MARCUS: So if John Iglehart files a document and says I'm the owner of this company, I mean, there has to be -there has to be a document from Barbara and/or Bill Stewart saying we are transferring this property. John Iglehart never said he was an owner of any of this. It was never -- he was a person who was, just for purposes of appearances, I guess, he was the -- he put himself in as a beneficial owner, as a shareholder, but he's never claimed that he had any ownership There was no claim in this case by anyone. this appears to have been some type of -- all I can -- and this is -- you know, what I surmise from it, that was some type of tax shelter which was done for purposes of keeping Bill Stewart and mainly Barbara Stewart's name out of the documents to avoid a, you know, exactly what they said, avoid wealth tax or avoid some inheritance tax, what have you. And so it was put -- John Iglehart was listed as a director. He put himself in as a shareholder. There has to be some other agreement between Iglehart and whether it is Bill Stewart or Barbara Stewart that details what this company was all about. But it has nothing to do with Michele Stewart, and Michele Stewart hasn't evenly pled that it was John Iglehart that was the owner of the company. And if that's the case, why is Iglehart continually writing Barbara and Bill Stewart saying, you know, sign these, you

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know, saying that it was -- you know, show beneficial owner?

And then why aren't they responding at the time when Barbara

(unintelligible), she says, hey, I thought I put all this

jewelry in Topaze, can you just please confirm that for me so

that I could tell the marital court? And when the marital

court was not informed, because they said -- Michele said I

don't have any information. Iglehart, they didn't respond, or

they said they didn't have it. And then Barbara was found to

be not credible at the hearing. And she was attributed with -
all this jewelry was attributed to our side of the balance

sheet, and so she got -- she ends up with virtually nothing.

THE COURT: I get that. But the point is just listening to you makes my point, my point being that there isn't a clear record. The fact may be that there never will be a clear record, I don't know. But I think we ought to get to the point where each side has to say that's all I can produce to support my side. And once we've reached that point, we'll then see if either party can actually get over the 50 percent part.

But I do think -- and I raised it and everything you are saying raises more questions about Mr. Iglehart with me. But I do want to point out to you that if you would look at there are Irish documents that in April of 1994 Michele Bouman becomes a director, but, guess what, she is not listed as a director by 1997. I don't know what's going on, but, frankly,

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neither do you. And until I have a better sense of what is going on, I am not about to sort of come down on the side of either party when there is much left to be discovered. Maybe it will never be discovered. I don't know. Because maybe some of this stuff is in Switzerland and Mr. Iglehart has destroyed documents. We don't know whether he has or not, and maybe we need to have some lawyers from abroad give us an education in this — what Topaze really is and what it can be and how this stuff works there. I don't know.

But I go back to what I said to you at the very outset the first time I met you: You should settle this case. No one is getting younger. And there are rational ways to work through this. But, you know, that is up to you. I think we've --

MR. MARCUS: Judge.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. MARCUS: If I may? To the extent that --

THE COURT: Identify yourself. Sir, identify

yourself.

MR. MARCUS: I'm sorry. Dave Marcus for the plaintiff.

To the extent -- I understand what you're saying. But then, at the very least, I think discovery should be limited to the issues that you are referencing. Because what's happening here is the defendant is only interested in discovery that goes

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into the, you know, our conversations in which they seem to only be interested in issues of jewelry with regard to what Barbara talked to Tres about or what Barbara talked to her sons or Bill, and we would have had to go through so many years of her emails, go through every single — I mean, you could only imagine how many emails were sent to family members and every email that uses the word rock or ring or whatever it was, they had a whole list of emails. And it would be such a gargantuan task for us to go through that and sort through it.

We've produced everything --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Let me interrupt you.

Can't that be done by a service where, you know, like that you give search terms? It is not that you sit and read them. It is that the stuff gets loaded into, you know, some computer with search terms, and then, you know, the documents which have those search terms pop up and then you read them?

MR. MARCUS: Right. But even though I'm saying --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt here. Why can't you afford to do that?

MR. MARCUS: Because our resources are very limited in this case. I mean, it's just — if it were something that would produce anything that had anything to do with Topaze, the ownership of Topaze, the transfer of Topaze, we have produced all of that. All of that has been produced. We produced everything. I think they've produced everything, and they've

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said they produced everything in that regard. But to go off on discovery on issues that would really reflect damages in the event that they were successful on their counterclaim and say, well, OK, you know, do you still have this piece or that piece, or what did you do with jewelry when you were 40 years old or 30 years old, or to go back into all that is just -- it expands the scope of discovery tenfold. And it's not limited to the issues that are essential to determination of the liability of this case, the liability of the parties. And so it puts a tremendous burden on us to respond to discovery, which I don't think is part of any of this discussion that we're having here. I don't -- you know, I would respectfully disagree that I think the motion -- I think the motion speaks for itself. I think they can't plead it. They haven't pled it. They can't plead a counterclaim, and that would narrow the scope of discovery substantially.

But to the extent that your Honor believes that we should do discovery that will flesh those issues out, then I think discovery, at least in the initial stages, ought to be limited so that we can make those findings. And then if they're successful on their motion, or if we lose the motion, and, you know, at some point in time, OK, then maybe you get into other issues. But it would be certainly in plaintiff's interest if discovery could be narrow at this point. But if the Court is not going to rule on our motion to dismiss the

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counterclaim, let's at least narrow the discovery to the issues that would flesh the answers to that out.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, this is Catherine Kelly. May I respond to that?

THE COURT: Sure. Of course.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, this is a case of the plaintiff just trying not to fulfill her obligations in federal court. I mean, plaintiff filed this suit. We filed counterclaims. We conducted an exhaustive search for documents, hardcopy and electronic. We produced all of those documents, including documents that we withdrew from Mr. Iglehart's file. We also conducted a search of the Irish documents that your Honor was referring to that have been publicly available since the time they were filed. And since that time, we have also produced documents that we found from the British Virgin Islands, which we also produced to the plaintiffs. They were also publicly available since the time they were filed.

The plaintiffs have not — they are just making conclusory statements about their burden. This case has not been bifurcated. All of our requests are relevant. They have not argued otherwise. They have not conducted any preliminary searches to determine that the number of hits is overly burdensome. They haven't provided the Court with any estimates of how long the review would take and to establish that it's

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just too long. They just don't want to do the work. They don't want to spend the money.

So, your Honor, there is absolutely no basis to their argument. We have provided them with our exhaustive list of search terms, which they refused to do. Then we said, OK, fine, we'll give you a slimmed down list of search terms to conduct. They refused to do that. They refused to give us a list of the search terms that they did use, and they refused to give us a search — a list of search terms that they propose to use. They just don't want to do it.

It's not -- that is not what the rules obligate the parties to do in federal court.

I'm sorry. Just to follow up. We have identified areas in which plaintiff's production is deficient. For example, your Honor, we sought all communications between plaintiff and anybody else regarding her jewelry. She only produced three pages of documents. I mean, as we have been discussing, she established this company as a tax shelter 28 years ago. Topaze owned 80 pieces of jewelry that were for a purchase price of \$80 million.

THE COURT: What document shows that? What document shows that -- ever -- that jewelry worth \$80 million was deposited, in a sense, into Topaze and became the property of Topaze, at least for some period of time?

MR. GRANTZ: Your Honor, this is Dave Grantz speaking.

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Just briefly. I think Catherine misspoke slightly about \$80 million. I think the number isn't 80 million. So why don't we just clarify the record on that? I think the jewelry that has been placed in there is closer to 8 to \$10 million, not 80 million. So that was the first comment.

Then the second is we don't have a lot of documents from 28 years ago because this was 28 years ago, and, you know, the difficulty in obtaining documentation that goes back that far is just the nature of age. And when we inquired of Mr. Iglehart, his comment to us is he has a ten-year retention requirement in Switzerland. So we may or may not --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt right on that. That is not an answer, that there is a mandatory ten-year retention statute. Has he ever sworn in a piece of paper that he destroyed documents, even though he had a continuing client relationship that continued well after ten years involving these exact same entities? I don't think lawyers go off and destroy old documents when they have continuing client relationships on a subject matter. So, I'm not so sure that I buy his excuse for not providing documents. Maybe it is that he is now aligned with the defendant and doesn't want to produce the earlier documents. I don't know. But I am very suspicious about this. You can tell that from --

MR. GRANTZ: I appreciate it. This is Dave Grantz again. I appreciate the suspicion.

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So a couple of comment about that. So this information that Ms. Stewart has been seeking for many, many years to establish her position in the divorce case is troublesome, because she never went to Switzerland at that time and sought a subpoena of Mr. Iglehart and never did anything to enforce her rights as the client of Mr. Iglehart to get -- to gain these documents. It was only after the divorce case when she took issue with Ms. Bouman and Mr. Iglehart. Never once did she do anything from a legal standpoint to obtain the documents. And that's even borne out more by the fact that we just found publicly-available records, records that were available since the '90s and the early 2000s, and we produced them by purchasing them for a few dollars on the Internet. Those records were there. They were there when she was in her divorce case. Her attorney didn't seek them. They didn't present them.

And Mr. Marcus' conclusions that her credibility on this issue was implicated by Michele Bouman or Mr. Iglehart refusing to provide documentation to her is just simply absurd. I mean, her credibility is damaged by so many other problems, and for that reason we're looking for the divorce record. And the reason why we're looking for these other records is because we believe that there are multiple admissions.

I mean, Mr. Marcus doesn't want to do these searches and provide us with correspondence between Ms. Stewart, her

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family members, because he knows that she says things in emails that are going to be problematic, and we want to see what those things are. It is a reasonable request. Admissions against interest are going to be particularly helpful in this case to us.

I wanted to get back to one other comment you made earlier, Judge. You said that it is going to be a problem, potentially, for one or the other side or maybe both sides to prove the case. And you're absolutely right. The case is rife with evidential problems, because the records are old, the information is in Switzerland. The way to obtain it would be through the Hague Convention subpoena, but neither party wants to go through that process —

THE COURT: Why?

MR. GRANTZ: -- because it is expensive and uncertain.

And so everyone seems to let Mr. Iglehart off the hook.

And then, to your last comment, this case should be settled. There is absolutely no reason for this case to continue. We've made a settlement proposal. Got no response. We'd like to have an opportunity to go through either a mediation or an alternative dispute solution, because this case cries out for settlement. I mean, the parties each have a portion of the jewelry in their possession. It just doesn't make sense to spend all of this money litigating when we could resolve it but we just don't seem to have a partner in that

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1 resolution.

MR. MARCUS: If I may, Judge? Dave Marcus for the plaintiff.

I think a settlement proposal of withdrawal of the lawsuit is not a settlement proposal.

Secondly, with regard to the divorce record, it is simply not true. I spent -- we had three conference calls with Ms. Kelly. We spent -- we initiated them and had spent an enormous amount of time talking about it. She insisted on getting the entire divorce record. She wanted the transcripts and the exhibits. There are 6,000 or so pages of it. At the conclusion, I think it was the third time that we spoke with her, we pressed her and said, you appear to have all this stuff because you have been citing it. And she said -- and she then acknowledged, yes, we do, we have all of it. So after all of that --

MR. GRANTZ: That is not true.

MR. MARCUS: That is. She said you have it. And I confirmed that in a letter. I don't.

(Unintelligible)

THE COURT: Stop. Stop.

I've read your letters. There is not an admission by defendants that they have everything from the divorce proceeding. They acknowledge -- I don't recall the specifics, but they have some of it.

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I agree with you, if they have it, they shouldn't be asking you for it again.

Look, guys, if you are not prepared to spend the money to prosecute your case, to learn everything that is learnable, then the answer is you settle. That is rational. But you can't not do what needs to be done and then somehow say, Judge, you figure it out but we're not going to tell the Court all the information that would be the basis for an accurate decision. I don't -- I want to get it right, and it is your job to present the actual evidence to me. And if you don't want to spend the money on a Hague Convention subpoena, then somebody is going to live with a determination that you haven't gotten past the 50 percent point.

MR. MARCUS: With regard, Judge, to Iglehart, that —
it's not accurate when Mr. Grantz says that nobody tried to get
that. Mr. Iglehart was sued in Switzerland by Swiss lawyers
who went after his file. It was brought — it was before the
equivalent of the Bar Association there. And his files — and
they are well aware of this because I did explain this to Ms.
Kelly in great detail on the phone with her that his files were
ultimately, after extensive, I think, litigation — I wasn't
involved in that. I was (unintelligible). It was a difficult
process. He produced his files to Swiss counsel, who produced
them to me. We reviewed them in their entirety and produced
anything relevant to defense counsel.

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1 There was --

THE COURT: Excuse me. You have more of his files that --

MR. MARCUS: I have, it is just financial stuff. It is bank records. It is other stuff. It has nothing to do with -- but anything that was -- that had anything to do with the jewelry were produced -- was produced. There were --

THE COURT: Hold on. Have you produced every single paper from Mr. Iglehart's files about Topaze and the successor entity? Every single paper? Yes or no?

MR. MARCUS: Every single -- yes. Yes. Definitively yes.

There was only one piece -- I would have to go back and confirm that, but I believe there was only one piece of paper that had anything to do with Topaze in his file.

Everything else was just -- it was hundreds and hundreds of pages of bank -- I think he was power of attorney for Ms. Stewart, and so he was keeping bank deposits and what have you. I have no problem producing the whole file but --

THE COURT: And how are you so sure?

MR. MARCUS: So sure?

THE COURT: If he had power of attorney for the plaintiff, again, how does he go represent the defendant? But that's OK; assume just another part of my suspicion here. But when he is exercising this power of attorney, how are you so

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sure that he has nothing to do with the underlying facts of this case?

MR. MARCUS: My recollection -- I don't have it in front of me. My recollection is just simply bank records from Swiss -- from Swiss -- most of it. I have no problem producing the whole -- I'll produce the whole Iglehart file. I would imagine I have no -- I have no qualms about that. It is just I wasn't going to just do a document dump if there is nothing in there.

I went through the entire file. I searched. I went through it personally. And I produced — there was the one letter I believe that we did produce that was a letter from him to Michele. That was the one with the eleven kisses, X's and O's, that was produced. I believe it was a 2012, if I'm not mistaken. But other than that, there was nothing — there was nothing on Topaze, there was nothing on DGBF, there was nothing at all in his file that he produced to Swiss counsel that had anything to do with any of the issues in this case. There was simply a bank transaction and other stuff that he had — he had represented Barbara Stewart for many, many years and whatever it was he had. Again, I don't have it in front of me, but it was nothing that had any relevance that they would be interested in going through, so I did not produce the whole file.

But I did tell them that I did have that file. I

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imagine maybe they have the file as well. But I don't know what they got from Mr. Iglehart. They got apparently other information, other documents from Mr. Iglehart that we did not have, that were not in the file that he produced to us.

MR. GRANTZ: This is Dave Grantz, Judge.

Whatever documents we got from Mr. Iglehart, we produced. We have no other files. We have no other information. The information that he is talking about now related to a proceeding that came after the divorce, I guess when Ms. Stewart was frustrated with the result of her divorce and wanted to gather documentation and prosecute Mr. Iglehart criminally for his conduct, and she also brought a proceeding against Ms. Bouman in Switzerland criminally for her conduct as related to the divorce. I don't know what happened in Mr. Iglehart's proceeding. In Ms. Bouman's proceeding, the case was dismissed and she was told to pursue Ms. Bouman civilly.

We would like to see any documentation that Mr. Marcus has obtained from Mr. Iglehart, and we'll make our own determination as to whether or not something is or isn't relevant or is pertinent to the matters of this case, and we would appreciate that he does produce those things to us.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, also -- this is Catherine
Kelly. If I may just briefly discuss the divorce issue, which
Mr. Marcus raised a couple of minutes ago?

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I am not sure the chronology laid out was accurate. But what we are requesting, your Honor, are the deposition transcripts, the pleadings, motions, and other documents filed with the divorce court, and plaintiff's discovery responses. Plaintiff has objected, saying that those documents are not relevant and overly burdensome. But, I mean, as we've been discussing, those documents are clearly relevant, because in that proceeding the plaintiff repeatedly disclaimed any interest in the jewelry and testified to this fact multiple times under oath, claiming that she transferred all the jewelry to Topaze and that Michele owned Topaze. Of course, we now — we know that she is arguing the exact opposite here, and that's why we want those documents.

We subpoenaed plaintiff's ex-husband for these same documents, and he told us that he is willing to produce them to us if plaintiff gives consent.

THE COURT: OK. That's the end of it. So long as the two parties to the matrimonial agree that the matrimonial record can be produced to third parties, they are available. The law is otherwise that normally it is only the husband and the wife, or the two, you know, who have access to the testimonial proceeding. But if there is no objection on the part of the husband, then we're just into a regular discovery dispute.

MR. GRANTZ: Your Honor, this is Dave Grantz. Sorry

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1 | to interrupt.

I agree with you completely on that point. The problem is that we don't have consent from Ms. Stewart to get those records from Mr. Stewart.

THE COURT: She doesn't --

MR. GRANTZ: She doesn't consent.

THE COURT: Wait a minute. She doesn't want to -- the plaintiff is resisting producing them in this case, but that isn't the same thing as getting permission from the husband. If the husband gives you permission, gives the defendant a letter that says I have no objection to the records of my matrimonial proceeding with my former wife being produced in the context of this litigation, what else do you need?

MR. GRANTZ: Well, he's given us that letter. She won't produce the records, or she won't consent to have him give them to us. She is the one holding us up, not him.

THE COURT: I got that.

MR. GRANTZ: So all we need to do is have her consent and he'll give us all the records.

Are you ordering her to consent?

THE COURT: Mr. Marcus, why shouldn't, if there is no burden and your position is they are irrelevant, so, you know, produce or not, that doesn't make them relevant. If they are not relevant, they will remain not relevant. So what possible objection can you have? No burden on you because you don't

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have to be the one producing them. Relevance is ultimately determined by me, not you. End of story.

MR. MARCUS: Right.

THE COURT: Right?

MR. MARCUS: I suppose I don't have any strong objection. I was --

THE COURT: OK. Done.

MR. MARCUS: -- certainly (unintelligible) --

THE COURT: Done.

MR. MARCUS: Go ahead. You can get them from Mr. Stewart.

THE COURT: OK.

MR. MARCUS: You could say I don't object.

Now, my understanding is you have the record --

THE COURT: I don't care anymore. Let them have it.

They can get it direct from Mr. Stewart. Excellent.

MR. MARCUS: OK.

THE COURT: All right. So we've now covered the Tres subpoena. We've covered the attorney-client privilege issue, which I would expect some submissions on from the defendant, and, of course, plaintiff can respond. I think that we have some issues about search terms.

And I guess the answer, Mr. Marcus, since you brought the case, is you want to make a submission about the cost and burden of doing the search that the defendants want you to do.

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You really need to do that with, you know, real expert testimony. You need to have one of these companies say for us to work through this amount of records, it will cost the plaintiff, you know, five dollars. Since you can't just say it, you just can't say it. That is not sufficient.

MR. MARCUS: Well, our main point -- this is Dave

Marcus speaking for the plaintiff. Our main point, Judge, is

it doesn't go to any of these other issues, and it is just

burdensome, it is irrelevant, to have us go through every email

that Barbara sent to any one of her children --

THE COURT: How about sent emails talking about your jewelry? I mean, give me a break. Seriously?

MR. MARCUS: It is not just jewelry, but if you look at the list of words that they have in there, it's an enormous list. It would pop up -- it would pop up many, many, many emails, and it is just -- it is not going to -- you know. I mean, I could tell you I spent about two weeks going through documents. We have many, many documents in this case, documents I spent an enormous amount of time and enormous detailed effort to go through and pull up everything that we thought was relevant in this case to the issues that dealt with any of the issues in this case. And we had conferenced with defense counsel prior to discovery, and we talked about search terms. And we agreed to, you know, let's make our demands and then we'll respond accordingly and that we didn't need to sit

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and identify specific search terms from the getgo. We had that initial conference.

And then now they come back and say, well, you didn't produce enough documents and, therefore, go back and do the whole thing again and find me documents that are related to our counterclaim, if you have any. If she has a piece of jewelry that maybe she gave to, you know, somebody, or whatever, I don't know what relevance — it has nothing to do with Topaze or anything like that because we've done those searches. So we've definitely produced every document, I could tell you, with an enormous amount of effort. This is not us looking to — you know, I — I don't agree with their assessment that, you know, we're sitting here and we just don't want to do the work. We have done the work, and it was an enormous amount of work to go through all these documents, and they were produced.

THE COURT: How could you do this without agreeing on search terms in the first place?

MR. MARCUS: Well, actually --

THE COURT: I'm going by my client's file, isn't that the way it's done these days? Not when I was a practicing lawyer, because we didn't have search terms back then.

MR. MARCUS: Right.

THE COURT: Right? But now that's what lawyers do.

MR. GRANTZ: Your Honor, this is Dave Grantz.

It is fairly uncomplicated. She has a phone. She has

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a computer. She has email. You upload that stuff to an e-discovery company. You provide them with the search terms. They put it on the relativity platform, and then they do the They tell you how many hits there are, and they tell you how many search terms hit. And then they say you have 60,000 hits and you have, you know, 20,000 pages of deduplication and we're going to eliminate the deduplication. Now you have 40,000 pages. Then you narrow the search terms down to the more relevant search terms, and then you produce them to the other side. And they put them on their relativity platform, and they look at those documents in the way that we look at documents today. And we make the determinations as to whether or not relevancy is an issue. He doesn't get to make that determination. It is a broad standard for discovery, and that's why e-discovery is so expensive and complicated, because we have to have other companies come in and do the searches for us. But they don't want to give up her phone or her computer to a company, and they don't want to expend the money with the company to do the work that needs to be done. But we want to see that material, and we're not walking away from it. certainly didn't waive our right to it by not agreeing to specific terms. We reserved our rights in connection with this, and when they didn't produce anything of significance or, you know, that was meaningful, we knew that they were either not searching or they were withholding.

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MS. KELLY: Your Honor --

MR. MARCUS: Dave Marcus here.

MS. KELLY: I'm sorry. Just as a follow up to what Mr. Grantz was saying. For example, plaintiff did not produce any documents at all with her son, Tres, who was involved in these issues. He was the one that was involved, if the Court remembers, in 2012 with retrieving earrings, ruby earrings, that Topaze owned. He retrieved them from Michele in Switzerland, because Ms. Stewart was threatening that if Michele did not turn those over for her to pay her counsel fees, that Ms. Stewart was going to take her house away from her. Tres was the one and had multiple communications with Michele regarding the retrieval of those earrings.

Tres has also submitted an affidavit in connection with this matter in opposition to our motion to dismiss. We expect that there are multiple communications not only with Ms. Stewart and Tres regarding that issue but also between Tres and plaintiff counsel. Those documents are not produced. Barbara also did not produce any communications with her husband. There was only one, rather, communication with her husband. That's just unbelievable considering that they created this entity together 28 years ago and Mr. Stewart repeatedly purchased pieces that were transferred to Topaze. So these are the types of documents that we're looking for. They are directly related to not only plaintiff's claims but also ours.

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And our -- the search terms that we proposed are directly -- you know, would directly hit these documents.

MR. MARCUS: Dave Marcus. If I could respond?

We had this conversation and I asked Ms. Kelly how they obtained documents from Ms. Bouman, and the response was that she went through her own emails and decided what was relevant and not. So this was not a situation where they went to a service and looked through these, either. And they're the ones that are saying that she took ownership. I don't want to repeat myself on this. It seems to me Barbara Stewart was asking repeatedly during this marital case: Do you have any documents? I don't have anything. Give them to me.

And so it is clear that she was not involved in any of this either from a (unintelligible), or down the line in terms of Topaze or DGBF, she didn't know what was going on. She never signed any documents. All of them would be with either Iglehart or Michele Bouman.

And what was produced -- apparently, Ms. Bouman didn't haven't any. But there was no effort -- and correct me if I'm wrong, Ms. Kelly -- you told me, to my recollection, that she just went through her own emails and produced what she felt was relevant. She culled out what she thought was relevant. So we -- you know, there was some understanding here that that was the way it was done, and perhaps -- perhaps you would have to do the same thing. You know, if we are going to do this and

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really get into detail on it, then both parties should be subject to the same rules.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, it is correct that Ms. Bouman conducted the search of her own emails. We produced the exhaustive search of search terms that she used. There is no assertion by plaintiff that there is any problem with the production that Ms. Bouman provided. There are other papers that are submitted to the Court and on which we are conferencing right now relate to the -- you know, as far as plaintiff is concerned, our production is sufficient.

The problem here is the search terms and the way in which Ms. Stewart conducted her search. And like I said before, we provided our search terms. They refused to do other similar search. And when I was meeting and conferring with Mr. Marcus, he admitted to me that they could probably do some additional search terms, but then he refused to get into which ones they did and which ones they would be willing to do, so therein lies the problem and why we --

MR. MARCUS: Dave Marcus responding.

That's is not true, Ms. Kelly, and we talked about this. And I said -- I admonish you not to say that, because we had this conversation and you repeatedly made this comment. I told you what search terms we used. We did Topaze both ways, both spellings. We did DGBF. We looked through every document that had anything to do with an email either from Iglehart or

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Michele Bouman, and we looked at the jewelry. Those are the ones we looked at. And that would have gotten anything, if there was an email with Tres or with Lisa Stewart or one of the children, it should have pulled that up, and anything that would have been relevant to this case it would have pulled up. We ran those searches and we did it with great detail, and I spent an enormous amount of time going through the enormous number of documents that I had in my file and, you know, whatever I had on the marital case, etc., etc. And I think for me to rerun searches where I just run Jeffrey Stewart, every email for Jeffrey Stewart (unintelligible) is not going to come up with anything else. It's not going to deal with the jewelry or Topaze or Tres Stewart. It is not going to deal with any of those.

MS. KELLY: That's not what we asked for.

MR. MARCUS: We have what we have.

MS. KELLY: That's not what we asked for. You know, we asked for the search terms. The Court has Exhibit D to our --

THE COURT: Excuse me. Excuse me.

Mr. Marcus.

MR. MARCUS: Yes.

THE COURT: Did you personally run these -- whatever search terms you used, did you personally run those because you have somehow in your office the plaintiff's email collection?

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MR. MARCUS: I don't have her entire email collection, but I have hundreds of thousands of pages of documents from prior hearings, what have you, and from Barbara Stewart, because I represented her for ten years. I personally ran those searches on all -- and we have -- I have tried to accumulate them. And I don't have their entire database of I don't know that I am required to do that on her emails. That's the one thing that I have some -- I had some emails. emails from her. I had some years ago, I had -- I had copied a number of files from her. But other than that, I asked her to run it on her -- and I couldn't tell you when that email that she has currently -- it is a Gmail account. I couldn't tell you when that started, but I asked her to run those -- those other searches independently. I personally ran the searches from my end on everything that I had on my computer and every document that we have in our files are computerized, and so, you know --

THE COURT: Let me interrupt you.

Mr. Marcus, does this mean that there has not been a comprehensive search of the plaintiff's emails and her computer? Is that what it means?

MR. MARCUS: I wouldn't say that. I would say there was a comprehensive search for those search terms that I just described -- Topaze with an "e," Topaze without an "e," "EGBF," "Michele" as in Michele Bouman, "Iglehart," and "jewelry,"

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those, which I would, I feel, are comprehensive. I don't know what else there could be that would generate anything relevant to the issues that we're talking about in this case. Those are the search terms that I thought were — but they want me to run search terms of "rock" and, I don't know, some other — "ring," "rock," "Jeffrey Stewart." There are a number of names in there of people, some I don't even know who they are. And I don't know what they would have to do with this.

THE COURT: OK. If the defendants committed their own client to run the search of terms, then it's certainly acceptable for the plaintiff to let the client run the search terms. So, why don't we have Mrs. Stewart run some additional search terms. If you guys can't agree on exactly which ones — which additional terms Ms. Stewart ought to run searches on, you can submit your agreements and disagreements to me and I'll figure it out. How is that?

MS. KELLY: Sounds good, Judge. Thank you.

MR. GRANTZ: This is Dave Grantz.

It seems that that is the only resolution here, because we don't believe that Ms. Stewart ran searches and we don't believe that she is capable of running the searches. And we also don't believe that the production, you know, provides the documents that exist, because we know from other documentation that there were text messages and there were emails and there were discussions between Tres and her about

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the jewelry, and they just didn't produce any of them. So we know for a fact that there is documentation out there that hasn't been searched or produced. So if we can't agree, we are certainly OK with your Honor making the call.

As for her doing the searches herself, look, everybody is entitled to do that. There is no requirement under the rules that you hire a service to conduct a search. The requirement is that you do a complete search and produce all of the responsive documentation, which hasn't been done here. So if we can't agree on it, then your Honor has to make a call and issue an order; I agree with that.

THE COURT: OK. I think we've covered everything.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, there are a couple of additional smaller issues that we --

THE COURT: You are pushing it.

MS. KELLY: I apologize, your Honor.

THE COURT: You know, it is now one hour and about 15 minutes.

MR. GRANTZ: We appreciate your Honor's patience with us. This is Dave Grantz. We are all dealing with circumstances, and we appreciate your helping on this call with us and conducting this hearing via the phone. Hopefully, if we have to do this again, we will do it in person.

But Ms. Kelly is correct, there are a few other issues that we should bring to your Honor's attention and get them

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clarified so we can go forward.

THE COURT: Go ahead, quickly.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, we would like plaintiffs to use our definition of "jewelry" that we use in our request. We use the definition, to quote it, "Any item of jewelry owned at any time by plaintiff or Topaze/DGBF." We use that definition because, of course, this action relates to the jewelry that Topaze and DGBF owned, therefore those two should be included.

THE COURT: So what is the dispute about that?

MS. KELLY: The dispute is that plaintiff doesn't believe that it should include -- the definition should include any piece that the plaintiff has ever owned in her life. The reason, however, we included that --

THE COURT: No. No.

MS. KELLY: -- plaintiff's jewelry, any jewelry she owned in the definition, is because she has admitted under oath multiple times that the whole purpose of establishing Topaze was so that it would own all of her jewelry. So I think this is part of the issue, this plaintiff's production of documents, is that they were picking and choosing. Although they claim that they did search for "jewelry," they may have been picking and choosing which documents to include in the production, because they were not -- they didn't accept our definition of jewelry.

THE COURT: The plaintiff's substantive position here

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is that for tax reasons she placed the jewelry into Topaze.

Obviously her position is that during her lifetime she got to enjoy it and that after her life ended, that her granddaughters were going to own it. Her position is the defendant never owned it. But what -- I get that. Defendants want to say that somehow she became the owner of the plaintiff's jewelry. But I don't understand, given the plaintiff's position, why she would fight with you about that definition.

MR. GRANTZ: We don't understand it either. This is Dave Grantz speaking. So that is one of the --

THE COURT: What is wrong with their definition, given your theory of the case?

MR. MARCUS: Our position was that the issue should be narrowed. I thought the counterclaim was baseless and should be dismissed and it would narrow the discovery. For us to go through in detail to do a detailed search for all documents on any piece of jewelry that she ever owned at any point in time in her life and, you know, I don't -- you know, it just expands --

THE COURT: Well, wait a second.

MR. MARCUS: And it is not relevant.

THE COURT: Wait a second. If your position is that some necklace belongs to your client and, lo and behold, the defendant is in possession of that necklace now, isn't your position that it isn't the defendant's?

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MR. MARCUS: Right.

THE COURT: Why would you not -- look, I'm not interested -- although, you know, maybe when you do it once, you should just do the whole damn thing -- I'm not interested in the damages question of what is the jewelry that plaintiff has in her possession worth versus what is the value of the jewelry that defendant has in her possession worth. That is a damages question, but --

MR. MARCUS: That's where they are going.

THE COURT: Well, that may be. But you still are -your position has to still be all of these pieces of jewelry
are mine and let me list them for you. I own whatever it is,
40 pieces of jewelry. Why would you not list everything that
you own? And maybe, just maybe -- just a second -- maybe
knowing what the value of the jewelry in plaintiff's possession
is versus the value of the jewelry in defendant's possession
would be helpful when you try someday, God willing, to settle
this case.

MR. GRANTZ: Your Honor, this is Dave Grantz, and that brings up one other question. The issue that we raised --

MR. MARCUS: (unintelligible)

THE COURT: Only one of you can talk.

MR. GRANTZ: This is Dave Grantz.

The other -- that issue is a pertinent issue as well.

Ms. Kelly was probably going to get to it. But we asked for

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all of the jewelry that is in Ms. Stewart's possession, custody and control right now to be produced to our appraiser today.

Obviously, the COVID-19 --

THE COURT: I don't care about that.

MR. GRANTZ: -- put a crimp in that, and, unfortunately, we couldn't have that inspection done today. But we are going to need that inspection to be completed at some point so that we can see what jewelry she has and we can determine what the value is because that may impact damages in this case.

THE COURT: OK. I don't care about that right now.

Unless we get to some point where there is some greater

commitment to settlement, damages are separate. They have

nothing to do with the history of Topaze and who was supposed

to have ownership of this jewelry and who is eventually

supposed to have ownership of it, and who was to enjoy it

during Ms. Stewart's lifetime. OK? I don't care what the

value of it is until you really want to talk settlement.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor --

MR. MARCUS: This is Dave Marcus. If I can respond?

The Judge asked a question of me before. I can respond. Dave Marcus.

With regard to the question of the list of jewelry, we have suggested that we would do that if we could get a correspondence, and I think -- and it has been done. And Ms.

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Kelly has prepared a list of what Ms. Bouman is in possession of, and we have been in agreement that we would be happy to produce a list of what Ms. Stewart had in her possession. It occurred to me that would be sufficient for, instead of going and doing broad-based searches about each piece of jewelry and — you know, which could have nothing to do with any of the issues in the case, we're happy to produce a list of what we have in our possession, and maybe that would hopefully cut to the chase and save everybody a lot of time, needless time.

THE COURT: I don't think that what the defendants are looking for is primarily a valuation question, though I think it has obvious benefits. What they're looking for in her correspondence, they hope to find some kind of admission that helps the defendant's position here on the merits. And that, apparently, is what has not been looked for. And the potential of emails between Ms. Stewart and her children, her husband, might be useful. I'm not sure why that wasn't fully explored during the matrimonial, but I guess it wasn't.

MR. MARCUS: Dave Marcus here.

I think it was. I think that's what they have. I mean all the --

THE COURT: Then when? Then now that you will finally stop resisting the disclosure of the records in the matrimonial, then maybe some of that will be covered there and make some of these issues clearer now. But I don't really

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see -- look, I have resolved the issue of search terms. I don't want to go back to it. All right?

What else is left, Ms. Kelly?

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, two additional issues, and then we would just request the Court extend the time to conduct those three depositions that we requested and also for our demand of inspection.

But as far as the discovery issue is concerned, the two issues are defendant is objecting to produce any documents that she will identify or use as evidence at any hearing or trial in this action. She is claiming that that request is vague and ambiguous and overbroad —

THE COURT: I agree. You can't ask that question.

That is not a good question. No one knows what's going to be used at trial. As for documents, you don't ask for a disclosure now of your trial exhibits.

MS. KELLY: OK. All we're asking, your Honor, is to the extent plaintiff knows that there are particular documents that she intends to use at trial --

THE COURT: No. Stop.

MS. KELLY: OK. Thank you, your Honor.

And the final discovery-related issue is related to her affirmative defenses. She refuses to produce any documents relating or that could be factual support for her affirmative defenses. We believe that that's a proper subject of

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1 discovery, however.

THE COURT: I don't know what her affirmative defenses are. I don't know whether that actually makes any sense. Most lawyers put in, you know, a vast array of affirmative defenses that are absolutely meaningless, and I don't know that you really at this point really need that clarification. I really don't.

MS. KELLY: Thank you.

THE COURT: You are torturing each other sufficiently otherwise I think.

MS. KELLY: Thank you. Thanks a lot.

THE COURT: I don't care -- of course you can have an adjournment, and it is kind of hard, you know, to know exactly what makes sense, but maybe you guys can have a conversation with regard to that. It is really difficult, I appreciate it.

MR. GRANTZ: This is Dave Grantz here. I appreciate that, your Honor. Mr. Marcus and Ms. Kelly and I will meet and confer, and we will put together a new scheduling order to reflect the issues with COVID-19 and the other issues that relate to the case, because even if we had hoped to get some of this discovery completed in the next few months with these depositions, that's going to be virtually impossible now. We don't even have courts open in New York. We are not meeting face-to-face. And I would prefer not to take Ms. Stewart's deposition by phone or by computer.

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THE COURT: OK. Well, also, Ms. Stewart shouldn't be seeing anybody.

MR. GRANTZ: Right. She is elderly, and we are cognizant that we don't want anyone to get infected with the virus. We want to adhere to the respective governors' orders in our states.

THE COURT: Right. Of course. But, also, let's also remember that maybe this COVID situation will maybe put a little perspective into the case as a whole.

MR. GRANTZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: And the lifetime of fighting, which is just, you know, to me so antithetical to everything, you know, I am as a human being. So, you know, all I would say is when you submit anything going forward, like a new schedule, put it in the form of an order, which makes it something that's easier for me to just sign, you know, like on the so-ordered line.

MR. GRANTZ: Of course.

THE COURT: Because it is more complicated doing this all, you know, remotely. And just, you know, I don't want to start imposing any particular deadlines as to when the attorney-client privilege briefing ought to come in, because, honestly, I don't know what your personal situations are, and I recognize the total uncertainty of where we are even going to be three months from now. So, if you could talk to each other and work out a comprehensive schedule, I would find that very

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1 useful.

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MR. GRANTZ: We will do that, your Honor.

THE COURT: Put it in a -- you know, make it as easy as possible for me to sign my name.

MR. GRANTZ: Your Honor, is it possible for there to be an order for alternative dispute resolution? Maybe that can bring us to a resolution of this case. I don't know that we can do that --

THE COURT: Yeah. I think that a mediation may be somewhat functional on a remote basis. I guess my sort of issue with that would be that I know how complicated this is that I think it would be just awfully hard to try to do, you know, a settlement conference remotely without everybody there. To me, it would be very challenging.

MR. GRANTZ: I just want to raise it so that maybe we can get through some of this discovery and then revisit it.

THE COURT: Sure. It is a clear problem. You know, there may be some availability. You know, I just don't know how you do a kind of settlement where you can't ask someone to sort of leave the room, you know, sort of --

MR. GRANTZ: I completely agree.

MS. KELLY: Your Honor, actually, I was on the phone with some other attorneys yesterday who had just come out of a mediation, and the way that the mediator conducted it was to call the one party with the attorney on the line, discuss it

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with them, and then hang up, and then call the other attorney with their party, and at some point the mediator asked for the party to get off the line so that the mediator could just speak with the attorney. And the lawyer reported that the case wasn't settled but it wasn't because of the issues with navigating the phone lines. I've participated in mediation before the Southern District magistrates before. It is very great — you know, it is very great, so that's what we would be interested in doing, if your Honor —

THE COURT: Do you recall, I can look it up, but who your magistrate judge is in this case?

MS. KELLY: Judge -- oh, in this case?

MR. GRANTZ: I don't think we have one, Judge. I think you are on your own.

THE COURT: No, I'm never on my own.

MR. GRANTZ: Usually they --

THE COURT: No. Hold on a second. I can pull this up on my -

MR. GRANTZ: This is Dave Grantz. I'm surprised that we have a magistrate judge. I would have thought that the magistrate judge would have dealt with all of these discovery issues.

THE COURT: No. I was a magistrate judge for 19 years. I have learned as a district judge that there are fewer disputes if you have to talk to me. OK? I find that, you

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1	know, lawyers feel a little bit more constrained.
2	MS. KELLY: Your Honor, I believe it is Magistrate
3	Judge your Honor, I believe Magistrate Judge Cott has been
4	designated.
5	THE COURT: OK. Well, you know, I don't know you
6	know, if you want to revisit it at some point, then I will
7	certainly, you know, ask him what his capacity from home is,
8	you know, to engage in settlement discussions with you.
9	MR. GRANTZ: I appreciate that, Judge.
10	THE COURT: Just let me know when it is truly ripe.
11	MR. GRANTZ: We'll meet and confer and get back to
12	you.
13	THE COURT: OK. All right. Sounds good.
14	MR. GRANTZ: Thank you.
15	THE COURT: OK.
16	MR. GRANTZ: Thanks for giving us the time today.
17	THE COURT: OK.
18	MS. KELLY: Your Honor, thank you so much for all your
19	help. I hope that you remain healthy.
20	THE COURT: I am going to try. You, too.
21	MS. KELLY: Thanks.
22	THE COURT: Very good. Goodbye.
23	(Adjourned)
24	